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Abstract 
Rational choice models argue that income inequality leads to a higher expected utility of 
crime and thus generates incentives to engage in illegal activities. Yet, the results of 
empirical studies do not provide strong support for this theory; in fact, Neumayer provides 
apparently strong evidence that income inequality is not a significant determinant of violent 
property crime rates when a representative sample is used and country specific fixed effects 
are controlled for. An important limitation of this and other empirical studies on the subject 
is that they only consider proportional income differences, even though in rational choice 
models absolute difference in legal and illegal incomes determine the expected utility of 
crime. Using the same methodology and data as Neumayer, but using absolute inequality 
measures rather than proportional ones, this paper finds that absolute income inequality is a 
statistically significant determinant of robbery and violent theft rates. This result is robust to 
changes in sample size and to different absolute inequality measures, which not only implies 
that inequality is an important correlate of violent property crime rates but also suggests 
that absolute measures are preferable when the impact of inequality on property crime is 
studied.  
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1. Introduction 
The determinants of crime rates have been a topic of interest to criminologists, sociologists 
and economists for decades. Several theories―such as strain theory (Merton, 1938; Agnew, 
1985) and rational choice theory (Ehrlich, 1973; Chiu and Madden, 1998)―argue that 
economic inequality is an important factor in explaining why people perpetrate crimes. 
Henceforth, income inequality has been among the main variables considered in empirical 
cross-country studies on the correlates of crime. 
While a broad empirical consensus exists that inequality is a strong predictor of 
differences in homicide rates across countries (Nivette, 2011), the evidence for the impact of 
inequality on property crimes is inconclusive. Some studies present results that support the 
hypothesis that inequality fosters property crime (e.g., Bennett, 1991; Fanjzylber et al., 
2002a, 2002b; Soares, 2004a, 2004b), whereas other studies do not find a significant 
relationship (e.g., Stack, 1984; Neapolitan, 1995; Neumayer, 2005, Sun et al., 2011). 
In particular, the contradictory results of Fanjzylber et al. (2002a, 2002b) and Neumayer 
(2005) merit attention. Fanjzylber et al.’s widely cited studies find that inequality is a 
significant and robust determinant of violent property crime even if unobservable country 
specific factors are controlled for, whereas Neumayer’s findings suggest that these results 
are biased by the sample size. To be more precise, using a similar methodology as 
Fanjzylber et al., Neumayer finds that “if we allow for a more representative sample … then 
income inequality is no longer a statistically significant determinant of violent property 
crime” (2005: 110).  
One important shortcoming of existing cross-country studies on the correlates of crime is 
that they employ relative inequality measures that account for the average disproportionality 
of incomes between households (such as the Gini Index or top-to-bottom income ratios). 
This focus on relative inequality seems unduly restrictive considering that rational choice 
models argue that the expected utility of crime is determined by the absolute difference 
between legal and illegal incomes (Ehrlich, 1973; Chiu and Madden, 1998). Hence, from an 
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economic point of view, absolute inequality measures (such as the variance and the 
difference between top and bottom incomes expressed in monetary terms) should be used to 
verify if income inequality is a significant determinant of property crime.1 
Existing cross-country studies may choose to consider relative inequality measures 
instead of absolute ones because the former are readily available for many countries, easy to 
interpret and widely used in a broad range of other socio-economic contexts. However, 
absolute measures fulfill the same technical properties as their relative counterparts (see 
Chakravarty, 2001), and the data requirements for their calculation are identical. The 
omission of absolute measures is therefore puzzling, especially when one considers that the 
above-mentioned property of rational choice models of crime is acknowledged by the 
empirical crime literature and that it is widely accepted that the differentiation between 
relative and absolute inequality is far from trivial. It has been shown, for example, that 
relative and absolute global inequality trends differ considerably (Ravallion, 2004; Atkinson 
and Brandolini, 2010; Bosmans et al., 2014; Goda, 2016; Goda and Torres García, 2016).  
Accordingly, it is not clear if the findings of the existing literature are influenced by their 
decision to consider only relative inequality measures. The aim of this paper is to help fill 
this gap in the literature by testing if absolute income inequality is a significant and robust 
determinant of violent property crime. To ensure that our results are not influenced by the 
data and methodology used, we employ the same research design as Neumayer (2005), with 
the major difference that our inequality proxies are the variance and the absolute income 
difference between the top and bottom incomes (instead of the Gini coefficient and the top-
to-bottom-ratio). 
                                                
1 To make the difference between absolute and relative inequality palpable, suppose that a country 
has two citizens (P and R) with respective incomes of $100 and $1,000. When viewed in relative 
terms, R has ten times the income of P, whereas in absolute terms, R has $900 more than P. If the 
income of both increases by 100%, the new income of P is $200 and the new income of R is $2,000. 
The result of this change is that relative inequality remains the same (R has still 10 times more 
income than P), but absolute inequality increases by $900 (the gap between the two is now $1,800 
instead of $900). 
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The results of this exercise show that absolute income inequality is a significant 
determinant of robbery and violent theft rates. In contrast to relative inequality measures, 
this finding is not affected by the sample size or the consideration of country-specific fixed 
effects. The main conclusion of our study is therefore twofold: (i) inequality is an important 
determinant of violent property crime, and (ii) in accordance with economic theory, absolute 
measures appear to be preferable to relative measures when the impact of inequality on 
property crime is studied. 
The layout of this paper is as follows. Section Two details the theoretical link between 
absolute inequality and violent property crime. Section Three gives an overview of the 
research design. Section Four presents and discusses the estimation results. Section Five 
concludes the paper. 
2. The theoretical link between absolute inequality and violent property crime 
The existing literature identifies various mechanisms through which inequality can foster 
crime. From a sociological point of view, the most well-known mechanism is social strain 
theory (Merton, 1938), which in essence argues that criminal behavior is the outcome of 
dysfunctional social and cultural dynamics that lead to general strain (Agnew, 1985, 1992), 
institutional anomie (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1997) and relative deprivation (Hagan and 
Peterson, 1995).  To be more precise, according to this literature, inequality (i) contributes to 
the weakening of social bonds and values (‘anomie’), (ii) increases the cultural pressure to 
be economically successful (‘quest for material success’), (iii) lowers the opportunity to 
achieve economic success in legal ways (imbalance between social goals and the means to 
achieve them), and (iv) contributes to the subjective feeling of being unjustly disadvantaged 
in comparison to others (‘relative deprivation’). In each of these four scenarios, crime is seen 
as deviant behavior that serves as outlet for social strain. 
The theory of relative deprivation in particular appears to refer to the concept of relative 
inequality. However, various surveys show that many people compare their status with 
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others in absolute, and not relative, terms (Ballano and Ruiz-Castillo, 1993; Harrison and 
Seidel, 1994; Amiel and Cowell, 1999). Given that some people favor absolute inequality 
comparisons, while others favor relative inequality comparisons, a priori it is not clear 
whether the concept of relative or that of absolute inequality is more suited to test the 
validity of social strain theory. 
The analytical framework typically used in economic research is based on Becker’s 
(1968) rational choice model of crime, which leaves aside possible social factors and instead 
uses a cost-benefit analysis to explain why people commit illegal activities. In Becker’s 
original model, the government chooses the optimal level of law enforcement to prevent 
criminals from undertaking crimes (i.e., a high probability of being apprehended and of 
receiving a harsh punishment impedes crime, but simultaneously, it is also costly), while 
Ehrlich (1973) assumes that under a given level of law enforcement, the individual chooses 
to engage in illegal activities depending on the potential monetary gains. In other words, 
Ehrlich’s model assumes that rational individuals choose to act in a manner that maximizes 
their expected net gains. 
In essence, Ehrlich’s (1973) model is an occupational choice model, in which an 
individual divides her time between legal ( lt ) and illegal ( it ) activities
 with the aim of 
maximizing her expected utility.2 The income if engaged in legal activities is given by ( )ll tW
. When engaging in illegal activities, however, there is a certain probability of being caught 
and punished ( ip ), which implies certain costs ( ( )ii tF ) that can reduce the gains of the illegal 
activity, ( )ii tW . The probability of not being caught and punished is ( )ip−1 . Furthermore, it 
is assumed that the individual has a stock of net wealth at the beginning of each period ( 0W ). 
Finally, to guarantee an interior solution, the model assumes that iW  and lW  have 
                                                
2 The complete model presented in Ehrlich (1973) assumes that time is distributed between market 
(legal and illegal) and non-market activities. To simplify the issue, we assume that the agent does not 
allocate time to non-market activities. Please note that the conclusion that the crime rate is positively 
related to absolute inequality is not influenced by this simplification. 
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diminishing marginal returns (i.e., for every additional unit of time spent, income earned 
increases to a lesser extent), whereas Fi has increasing marginal costs. 
Under these considerations, and assuming that time is normalized to one, the total 
expected income in the case of being caught and punished (Xa) is given by: 
( ) ( ) ( )iiiliia tFtWtWWX −−++= 10 ,                                            (1) 
whereas the expected income when not caught (Xb) is: 
( ) ( )iliib tWtWWX −++= 10 .                                                  (2) 
Taking ip  as exogenous, the individual chooses the values of  li tt ,  that maximize her 
expected utility function: 
( ) ( ) ( )biai XUpXUpUE −+= 1)( ,                                           (3) 
subject to restrictions (1) and (2).  
The first order conditions imply that:  
( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] 01 =−ʹ−+−−ʹ libiiliai wwXUpfwwXUp ,                           (4)        
where 
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The left-hand side of equation (5) shows the slope of the transformation curve of total 
expected income according to the two possible states of nature (being caught and punished 
or not). An increase in the time spent engaged in illegal activities raises the income obtained 
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from these activities and lowers the income obtained from legal activities, but at the same 
time, it raises the costs if caught. Hence, when more time is spent in illegal activities, total 
income increases when not caught, but decreases when caught.3 In the optimum, the 
marginal relation of substitution between the two possible states of nature (right hand side of 
(5)) should equal the marginal return of both states of nature. That is to say, the individual 
should not receive additional utility when spending additional time in illegal activities. 
Considering the diminishing marginal returns and assuming a utility function that is well 
behaved, the equilibrium position implies that the individual spends time in both activities. 
 The optimal condition implies that an increase of the left hand side of (5) raises the 
utility of crime and, as a result, the individual will choose to spend more time in illegal 
activities. Algebraically, this implies that a necessary condition to increase the time spent in 
illegal activities is: 
iili fpww >− .                                                          (6) 
Expression (6) also implies that “an increase in the marginal or average differential return 
from illegal activity, li ww − , resulting from an increase in (real) illegitimate payoffs or a 
decrease in (real) legitimate wages with no change in the other variables entering [equation 
(5)], can generally be shown to increase the incentive to enter into or allocate more time to 
illegitimate activity” (Ehrlich, 1973: 530). Accordingly, ceteris paribus, the crime rate “is a 
positive function of the absolute differential returns from crime” (ibid, 538; italics added).4  
Unfortunately, information concerning the absolute differential returns of li ww −  is not 
directly observable. However, an implication of the former analysis is that “the greater the 
income or wealth of potential victims, the greater will be the expected value of theft. 
Consequently, income has two conceptual influences on delinquency which operate in 
                                                
3 Therefore, the transformation curve has a negative slope. The transformation curve is also concave 
on the grounds that iW  and lW  have diminishing marginal returns. 
4 (6) also shows that the crime rate is a negative function of being caught and punished. An increase 
in either ip  or if  reduces the incentive to participate in illegal activities (ceteris paribus).  
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opposite directions” (Fleisher, 1966: 121). It thus follows that from an economic 
perspective, the most appropriate measures to proxy the net returns from crime are those that 
conceptualize changes in absolute income differences.5 
3. Research design 
The two main data sources of violent property crime used by previous studies are the 
International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) and the United Nations Crime Surveys 
(UNCS). Fanjzylber et al. (2002a, 2002b), for example, use UNCS robbery rates for a 
sample of 37 countries for the period 1970-1994 (five-year averages), whereas Neumayer 
(2005) uses Interpol data that allows him to consider robbery and violent theft rates for up to 
59 countries for the period 1980-1997 (see Appendix B). 
As mentioned in the introduction, when running regressions with a restricted sample of 33 
countries that is similar to Fanjzylber et al.’s (2002a, 2002b), Neumayer (2005) finds that 
inequality is a significant determinant of violent property crime rates (even when adding 
more control variables than Fanjzylber et al.). However, the significance of inequality 
vanishes if the sample is broadened to 50-59 countries. Therefore, Neumayer concludes that 
inequality is not a significant determinant of violent property crime when a representative 
sample and country-specific fixed effects are used. 
Considering the importance of the sample used, that Interpol data on violent property 
crime is not freely accessible and that the reliability of property crime rates has been 
                                                
5 Please note that the relation between illegal and legal income would need to be ( )li ww /  for relative 
measures to be the most appropriate for verifying the influence of inequality on crime. Interestingly, 
Fanjzylber et al. (2002b) and Neumayer (2005) accept that economic theory refers to absolute 
income differences, which is evident in the following two quotes: “studies interpreted measures of 
income inequality as indicators of the distance between the gains from crime and its opportunity 
costs” (Fanjzylber et al., 2002b, italics added), given that “inequality means a higher concentration of 
economic wealth in the hands of a few, which implies easier targets for potential criminals and raises 
the net gains of engaging in violent property crime” (Neumayer, 2005: 101, italics added). Hence, it 
is puzzling that these studies do not consider absolute inequality measures. 
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questioned in general6, we take advantage of the fact that a replication dataset for 
Neumayer’s (2005) publication is available.7 In other words, we use essentially the same 
data and methodology as Neumayer to ensure that our results are not influenced by the 
employed research design. The major difference between his and our study, following the 
theoretical considerations discussed in Section 2, is that instead of relative inequality 
measures, their absolute counterparts are used as the main variable of interest: our inequality 
measures are the variance (instead of the Gini Index) and the absolute per capita income 
difference between the top and bottom quintile of the population (instead of the top-to-
bottom quintile ratio).8  
Following Neumayer (2005), we study the impact of income inequality on the three-year 
averages of the number of robberies and violent thefts per one million inhabitants for the 
period 1980-1997 with the following model specification:  
!"(!"!") = ! + !!"! ! + (!! + !!") (7) 
where ! represents country, ! is time, !"(!") is the logged rate of robbery and violent theft, ! 
is a constant, !! are the explanatory variables with ! as the vector of coefficients to be 
estimated, ! represents unobserved individual country effects that are time-invariant, and ! 
is the error term. 
As mentioned above, our main variables of interest are the variance, which takes into 
account the entire distribution, and the absolute income difference between the top and 
bottom quintile (to proxy for the income gap between the poor and the rich). Following 
                                                
6 Existing crime databases provide very unbalanced data, and it is widely acknowledged that property 
crime data suffer from methodological changes, different operational definitions between countries, 
reporting errors, and underreporting (Neapolitan, 1995; Soares, 2004b; Fanjzylber et al., 2002a, 
2002b; Neumayer, 2005). 
7 The dataset is available at the website of the Journal of Peace Research (https://www.prio.org/JPR/ 
Datasets/). 
8  The exact counterpart of the Gini Index is the Absolute Gini Index (AGI); however, we prefer to 
use the variance on the grounds that the methodology to estimate it also produces the top and bottom 
income data that we need. The AGI and the variance are highly correlated, and the results presented 
in Table 3 stay robust when the AGI is used instead of the variance. 
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Goda and Torres García (2016), we use the Gini coefficients provided by Neumayer (2005) 
to estimate ventile income shares for each country and year under study (see (9) and (10) in 
the Appendix for more information). 9 These income shares are then used to calculate the 
variance (! ! ): 
! ! = !!" (!!" ∗ !"#!)− !"#$%! !!"!!!   (8) 
where !!" is the income share of the p-th population ventile, !"#!"# is the GDP per capita in 
purchasing power parity (PPP) of the i-th country, and !"#! is the total income of the i-th 
country. 
The GPD per capita in PPP as used in this calculation is derived from Neumayer’s 
dataset, while the total income is calculated by multiplying the GDP per capita by the 
respective population of the country (obtained from World Development Indicators). As 
shown in (8), we obtain the income of each ventile (!!" ∗ !"#!) in the process of calculating 
the variance. These data are used to calculate the absolute difference in the per capita income 
between the top 20% and bottom 20% of the population. Both absolute inequality variables 
are log-transformed to ease the interpretation of results. 
Following Neumayer (2005), the control variables used are the GDP growth rate, 
unemployment rate, urbanization rate, female labor force participation rate, proportion of 
males in the age group 15 to 64, polity measure of democracy, and a measure of human 
rights violations (Purdue’s Political Terror Scales). In addition, Neumayer includes GDP per 
capita and the square of this variable in his regressions to control for the level of economic 
development. Given that we use GDP per capita to calculate our measure of absolute 
inequality (see (8)), we prefer to use the urbanization rate to proxy for the level of 
development to avoid any potential problems of endogeneity (Neumayer finds that the level 
                                                
9 Neumayer uses Gini coefficients from the UN-WIDER database (2000), and he adjusts the 
expenditure Gini coefficients by adding 6.6 Gini points, which is common in the literature to account 
for the difference between expenditure and income inequality. Ventile income shares allow for 
relatively exact inequality estimates when income differences within income share groups are not 
taken into account (see Milanovic, 2012). Each population ventile represents 5% of the population. 
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of development has a non-linear effect on violent crime, hence we also include the squared 
term of the urbanization rate).10 The descriptive statistics of all variables considered are 
reported in Table 1. The corresponding correlation matrix of these variables (Table A1 in the 
Appendix) indicates that our regressions are not likely to be influenced by multicollinearity. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the variables used 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev Min Max 
ln(Violent Crime Rate) 206 5.58 1.45 0.21 7.91 
ln(Variance) 206 17.21 1.84 12.37 20.50 
ln(Top20-Bottom20) 206 9.55 0.93 7.16 11.13 
%Urban 206 63.94 21.20 11.20 100.00 
Economic Growth 206 0.97 4.90 -17.81 14.49 
Unemployment Rate 183 7.57 4.36 0.73 21.20 
Femle Labor Force Part. 206 37.05 9.97 7.47 55.63 
%Male 15-64 206 0.32 0.03 0.23 0.36 
Democracy 206 15.91 5.98 0.00 20.00 
Human Rights Violation 206 1.86 1.02 1.00 4.83 
 
Finally, it is important to mention that Neumayer uses fixed effects, random-effects and 
dynamic systems generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator regressions for his 
analysis. We abstain from reporting results obtained with dynamic GMM estimators, on the 
grounds that due to the need to use lagged values to instrument the dependent variable, the 
sample size becomes very small (<120 observations), which is likely to lead to a substantial 
loss of efficiency (Wooldridge, 2002). This issue might explain why all explanatory 
variables in Neumayer’s (2005) paper either change their sign or their significance when 
dynamic system GMM estimators are used instead of the fixed-effects models. This is likely 
to be the reason why Neumayer concentrates his analysis on the results obtained with fixed-
effects models. 
                                                
10 A broad consensus exists in the literature that economic development inevitably entails an increase 
in the urbanization rate (Todaro and Smith, 2012, Ch. 7). The correlation between the urbanization 
rate and GDP per capita in 1997 PPP is positive and above 80%. 
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A potential problem with the presented regressions could be endogeneity. However, it is 
not clear a priori if higher crime rates affect inequality because the amount of crime might 
not be sufficiently large to influence the general inequality structure. More importantly, as 
outlined in Section Two, theory expects crime to have a negative effect on inequality (i.e., 
more crime is expected to decrease inequality). Considering that the presented inequality 
coefficients have a positive sign and are statistically significant, it appears that endogeneity 
is either not present or that the inequality-reducing effect of crime is lower than the positive 
effect of inequality on violent crime. The latter case would influence the presented inequality 
coefficient values; however, given that our main interest is the sign and statistical 
significance, we conclude that potential endogeneity problems do not influence our main 
finding that absolute inequality fosters violent crime. 
4. The impact of absolute income inequality on violent property crime 
Table 2 presents the estimation results using the variance as the absolute inequality 
measure. Model (i) is a fixed-effects regression in which the sample size is reduced to 33 
countries with the aim of considering only those countries that are included in Fanjzylber et 
al. (2002b). In agreement with the Gini Index that is used by Fanjzylber et al. and Neumayer 
(2005), the variance has a positive sign and is statistically significant. The positive and 
significant effect of the variance stays robust when more control variables are added, as 
shown in Model (ii). This finding is also in line with the relative inequality results presented 
by Fanjzylber et al. and Neumayer.  
According to Model (ii), on average, a 1% increase in the variance leads to a 0.47% 
increase in the robbery and violent theft rate. Other important variables to explain violent 
property crime are the unemployment rate, the female labor force participation rate, the level 
of democracy, and the degree of human rights violation in the country. All of these control 
variables have the expected positive sign. Given that these results are similar to Neumayer’s 
(2005) results, it can be concluded that with a reduced sample size, the overall results 
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obtained are consistent irrespective of whether the variance or the Gini Index is the 
inequality measure. 
Table 2: The effect of income variance on violent property crime 
  (i)  
FE 
(ii)  
FE 
(iii)  
FE 
(iv)  
FE 
(v)  
FE 
(vi)  
RE 
ln(Variance) 
0.544 0.474 0.331 0.226 0.202 0.305 
    (3.95)*** (3.27)***     (3.48)***     (2.02)**   (1.90)*    (3.59)*** 
%Urban 
0.008 -0.075 0.038 0.033   0.062 
(0.33) (-1.27) (2.62)** (0.77) 
 
  (2.29)** 
%Urban squared 
  -.000   -.001   -.000 
  (-0.29)   (-1.21)   (-1.75)* 
Economic growth 
-0.014 -0.016 -0.005 -0.008   -0.011 
(-1.16) (-1.47) (-0.59) (-0.93) 
 
(-1.26) 
Unemployment rate   
0.059   0.033 0.026 0.060 
  (2.99)***    (1.98)** (1.67)* (4.05)*** 
Female labor force part.   
0.045   0.069 0.066 0.032 
  (1.89)*   (3.17)*** (3.50)*** (2.62)*** 
%Male 15-64   
13.206   3.607   -5.743 
  (1.42)   (0.48)   (-1.02) 
Democracy   
0.077   0.054 0.049 0.039 
  (4.34)***   (3.33)*** (3.34)*** (2.64)*** 
Human rights violations   
0.520   0.308 0.345 0.227 
  (3.54)***   (2.59)** (3.04)*** (2.47)** 
Observations 134 134 20 3 182 182 182 
Number of countries 33 33 58 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.21 0.48 0.19 0.40 0.39 0.35 
Hausman test chi-squared           59.72 
(p-value)           (0.00) 
 
Notes: This table summarizes the results of our panel data models for the logarithm of robbery and 
violent theft rates (three-year averages for the period 1980-1997). FE stands for fixed effects and RE 
for random effects. The values in parenthesis are t-statistics. All models include a constant that is not 
reported in the table. The significance of a coefficient or test statistic at the 1%, 5% and 10% level of 
significance is indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively,  
When the artificial sample size restriction of Models (i) and (ii) is lifted and the entire 
sample is considered, the effect of the variance on violent property crime reduces along with 
the explanatory power of the model (Model (iii)). Nevertheless, the effect of absolute income 
inequality on violent property crime stays positive and significant at the 1% level. Model 
(iv) and Model (v) show that the effect of absolute inequality remains positive and 
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significant, at least at the 10% level, when either all control variables are considered or only 
those that are statistically significant. 
In our parsimonious fixed-effects Model (v), a 1% increase in the variance leads to a 
0.2% increase in the violent property crime rate. According to this model, higher 
unemployment and female labor force participation rates, as well as a higher degree of 
democracy and human rights violations, also foster violent property crime (please note that 
these results are in accordance with the reduced sample size Model (ii)). Finally, it is 
important to note that the R-squared value of 0.39 suggests that the variation in violent 
property crime rates is explained reasonably well by this model. 
Our key finding is that income inequality is a statistically significant determinant of 
violent property crime when unobserved country specific effects are considered and the 
sample is representative; this result is in sharp contrast with the results presented by 
Neumayer (2005). As discussed above, Neumayer finds that income inequality (when 
measured by the Gini coefficient) is no longer statistically significant when the sample is 
increased to 59 countries and fixed-effects models are used. The strong discrepancy between 
our and Neumayer’s results has important implications. First, our results support economic 
theory that states that absolute differential returns between legal and illegal activities are an 
important determinant of crime. Second, the presented results reaffirm the widely made 
claim that inequality is a major cause of violent property crime. Third, the omission of 
absolute inequality measures in empirical studies on the correlates of crime appears to be a 
major shortcoming that can lead to incorrect conclusions about the impact of inequality on 
crime. 
Finally, Model (vi) replicates Model (iv) but uses random-effects instead of fixed effects. 
The results show that the main results are not influenced by this change in the estimation 
method. The only important difference is that in the random-effects model, the variables 
urban and urban squared become significant with the expected signs (i.e., economic 
development leads to an increase in violent property crime, but at a slightly decreasing rate). 
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However, the last row of Table 3 shows that the Hausman test suggests that the results of the 
fixed-effects Model (iv) are preferable over those of the random-effects Model (vi). 
Following Neumayer (2005), we repeat the analysis of Table 2 using an alternative 
inequality measure that considers the income differences between the poor and the rich. In 
our case, this alternative measure is the logarithm of the absolute per capita income 
difference between the top and bottom quintile. Table 3 shows that the obtained results are 
very similar when using this alternative absolute measure. Especially noteworthy is that the 
absolute inequality measure is statistically significant and positive in all specifications. In 
our parsimonious Model (v), a 1% increase in the absolute income difference between the 
top and the bottom leads to a 0.43% increase in the violent property crime rate. This result 
suggests that increases in absolute inequality between the top and the bottom have stronger 
effects on violent property crime than absolute inequality increases between other parts of 
the distribution. 
The results are also robust in the sense that the values and significance of the control 
variables reported in Table 3 are very similar to those reported in Table 2 and that the 
Hausman test shows that the fixed-effects Model (iv) is preferable to the random-effects 
Model (vi). This similarity in the results is not surprising given the very high correlation 
between the two inequality measures (see Table 2). In conclusion, the results of Table 3 
support our key finding that absolute inequality is an important determinant of violent 
property crime irrespective of the sample size and the consideration of unobserved country 
specific effects. 
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Table 3: The effect of top-bottom income differences on violent property crime 
  (i)  
FE 
(ii)  
FE 
(iii)  
FE 
(iv)  
FE 
(v)  
FE 
(vi)  
RE 
ln(top-bottom) 
1.178 1.054 0.699 0.492 0.433 0.637 
(4.00)*** (3.36)*** (3.46)*** (2.05)** (1.92)* (3.53)*** 
%Urban 
0.003 -0.082 0.037 0.032  0.061 
(0.12) (-1.39) (2.50)**  (0.74)  (2.25)** 
%Urban squared  
-.000  -.000  -.000 
 (-0.22)  (-1.20)  (-1.73)* 
Economic growth 
-0.014 -0.016 -0.005 -0.008  -0.010 
(-1.18) (-1.49) (-0.64) (-0.94)  (-1.23) 
Unemployment rate  
0.060  0.033 0.026 0.060 
 (3.05)***  (2.99)** (1.69)* (4.01)*** 
Female labor force part.  
0.043  0.068 0.065 0.032 
 (1.80)*  (3.14)*** (3.40)*** (2.63)*** 
%Male 15-64  
12.535  3.183  -6.346 
 (1.35)  (0.42)  (-1.12) 
Democracy  
0.078  0.054 0.049 0.039 
 (4.39)***  (3.34)*** (3.32)*** (2.66)*** 
Human rights violations  
0.526  0.310 0.346 0.236 
 (3.58)***  (2.61)** (3.05)*** (2.55)** 
Observations 134 134 203 182 182 182 
Number of countries 33 33 58 50 50 50 
R-squared 0.22 0.48 0.19 0.40 0.39 0.35 
Hausman test chi-squared      53.41 
(p-value)      (0.00) 
Notes: Please see the notes for Table 2. 
5. Conclusions 
The presented results suggest that absolute inequality is a statistically significant 
determinant of robbery and violent theft rates, irrespective of whether measured by the 
variance or by the absolute per capita income difference between the top and bottom 
quintiles. This finding supports economic rational choice models that state that absolute 
differential returns between legal and illegal activity are an important determinant of crime. 
Contrary to Neumayer’s (2005) findings, our results are robust when the sample is as 
representative as possible and unobserved country specific effects are considered. The 
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presented results not only reaffirm Fanjzylber et al.’s (2002a, 2002b) claim that inequality is 
a major cause of violent property crime but also suggest that the omission of absolute 
inequality is a major weakness in the existing studies on the correlates of crime. Thus, future 
crime research should consider relative as well as absolute inequality measures to verify 
whether absolute measures are also more robust than inequality indicators in other settings 
(e.g., when non-violent property crimes are considered or in single-country studies).  
Important policy implication of our analysis are that robbery and violent theft rates could 
be lowered by reducing absolute income differences and that economic growth does not 
lower violent property crime rates (not only because this variable is not statistically 
significant but also on the grounds that economic growth without redistribution 
automatically results in increasing absolute income differences). Other important 
determinants of crime that governments should take into consideration when aiming to 
reduce violent property crime rates are the unemployment rate, the level of democracy, and 
the degree of human rights violations. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
A. Calculation of ventile income shares 
The variance income shares for each country and year under study are required (see (8). 
Following Goda & Torres García (2016) and van Zanden et al. (2014), we suppose a 
lognormal distribution. Under this assumption, the relationship between the Gini coefficient 
and the Lorenz curve can be expressed as follows: 
 !(!) = !(!!! ! − σ!), (9) 
where Φ is the lognormal cumulative distribution function of income, ! is the percentile of 
the distribution, and !! is the standard deviation, which is associated with the Gini 
coefficient of each country and year under study as shown by the following expression: 
 !! = 2!!! !!!!! , (10) 
where !! is the Gini coefficient of the i-th country. 
 
 
B. Sample Countries 
Neumayer (2005) only considers those countries that have more than one observation: 
Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, 
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, 
Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, 
Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, USA, Venezuela, and Zambia. 
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C. Correlation Matrix 
Table A1: Correlation Matrix of Variables after Fixed-Effects Transformation 
  ln(Violent Crime) 
ln 
(Variance) 
ln(T20-
B20) %Urban 
%Urban-
squared 
Econ 
growth 
Unempl 
rate 
Femle 
labour 
part. 
%Male 
15-64 
Demo-
cracy 
Human 
rights 
violation 
  
           ln(Violent Crime Rate) 1 
          ln(Variance) 0.412 1 
         ln(Top20-Bottom20) 0.418 0.998 1 
        %Urban 0.346 0.501 0.522 1 
       %Urban squared 0.322 0.486 0.505 0.951 1 
      Economic growth 0.057 0.205 0.212 0.150 0.138 1 
     Unemployment rate 0.219 -0.078 -0.078 0.116 0.130 0.228 1 
    Femle labur part. 0.513 0.646 0.657 0.514 0.523 0.202 0.159 1 
   %Male 15-64 0.420 0.544 0.570 0.656 0.623 0.243 0.093 0.660 1 
  Democracy 0.289 0.152 0.160 0.371 0.403 0.020 0.042 0.137 0.290 1 
 Human rights violation 0.230 -0.033 -0.037 0.083 0.029 -0.128 0.213 0.060 0.074 -0.121 1 
 
